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Abstract—Demand Side Management (DSM) makes it possible
to adjust the load experienced by the power grid while reduc-
ing the consumers’ bill. Game-theoretic DSM is an appealing
decentralized approach for collaboratively scheduling the usage
of domestic electrical appliances within a set of households
while meeting the users’ preferences about the usage time. The
drawback of distributed DSM protocols is that they require each
user to communicate his/her own energy consumption patterns,
which may leak sensitive information regarding private habits.
This paper proposes a distributed Privacy-Friendly DSM system
that preserves users’ privacy by integrating data aggregation and
perturbation techniques: users decide their schedule according
to aggregated consumption measurements perturbed by means
of Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN). We evaluate the
noise power and the number of users required to achieve a
given privacy level, quantified by means of the increase of
the information entropy of the aggregated energy consumption
pattern. The performance of our proposed DSM system is
compared to the one of a benchmark system that does not support
privacy preservation in terms of total bill, peak demand and
convergence time. Results show that privacy can be improved at
the cost of increasing the peak demand and the number of game
iterations, whereas the total bill is only marginally incremented.
Index Terms—Smart Grid; Demand Side Management;
Privacy-Friendly Load Scheduling.
I. INTRODUCTION
Demand Side Management (DSM) is a proactive approach
aimed at managing the electricity demand of users based on
the needs of both customers and power grid [1]. By properly
redistributing loads through the local control of the electric
resources of residential users [2] it is possible to achieve
several benefits, among which preventing power outages and
curtailing the grid capacity and investments by shifting the
users’ demand from peak to off-peak periods [3]. Moreover,
DSM can increase the amount of Renewable Energy Sources
(RESs) that can be connected to the grid [4] by mitigating
issues related to demand-supply balancing, power quality and
unintentional islanding [5].
Users can be incentivized to properly shift their demand
through the adoption of convenient pricing schemes. Among
the energy tariffs already proposed in the literature, Real-Time
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Pricing (RTP) is generally advocated as the most efficient
solution to incetivize customers to conveniently shift their
loads [6]. In this case, the electricity price may exhibit hourly
changes and reflects the costs incurred by the system to satisfy
the users’ demand (e.g., higher prices during peak hours and
lower prices in off-peak hours). Consequently, tariffs evolve
based on the conditions of the power system and the efficiency
of the grid can be improved through minimization of the users’
bills [7]. However, the uncoordinated shifting of customers’
loads may cause large peaks of demand (e.g., during low-
cost periods) and, possibly, service interruptions. To contain
these unwanted side-effects and achieve relevant results from
a system-wide perspective, DSM must be applied to groups
of users (e.g., a neighborhood or micro-grids). Two different
types of strategies are proposed in the literature to design
these systems: centralized and distributed ones. In the first
case, consumers are considered unselfish and cooperate in
managing their resources. Centralized DSM frameworks are
typically based on optimization methods and aim to maximize
a shared utility function [8]. On the other hand, in case of
distributed systems, consumers are considered selfish and their
goal is to maximize their individual utility function. In this
case, each consumer locally defines his/her energy plan. In
order to design distributed frameworks, game theory is widely
applied since it naturally captures the strategic interactions in
such distributed decision making scenarios and helps to study
and predict the effects of consumers’ selfishness [9]. Moreover,
game theoretic DSM methods can be used to identify policies
that lead to socially optimal outcomes which improve the
efficiency of the whole power grid by means of reducing the
peak of the aggregated demand [10] and the users’ bills [11],
as well as by increasing the amount of RESs connected to the
grid [12].
The drawback of traditional game-theoretic DSM ap-
proaches is that they require users to communicate their own
energy consumption patterns to the other players: even if
aggregated over multiple appliances and on an hourly basis,
such data can still reveal the type of electrical devices in use
[13], [14], which in turn leaks sensitive information regarding
the private habits of the dwellers. Spatial aggregation over
multiple households and data perturbation by means of noise
injection are two countermeasures that have been already
combined with the aim of enhancing privacy in the context
of smart metering data collection (see, e.g., [15]).
In this paper, we formalize the notion of γ-privacy as a
2measure of the privacy of the users participating in a dis-
tributed game-theoretical privacy-friendly DSM system aimed
at reducing their daily electricity bill. In this game, the players
are the end-users, the set of strategies is their possible load
schedules and the utility function is their daily electricity bill.
Each customer has to schedule the time of use of his/her
shiftable electric appliances within a predefined time window
chosen according to his/her preferences, with the final goal
of minimizing the daily bill. A dynamic pricing approach is
used to determine the electricity tariff. For this game, we
define a communication protocol that integrates both data
aggregation and perturbation techniques: each user provides
to the other players a noisy version of his/her scheduled
power demand profile in order to obtain a cheap schedule
of the appliances’ starting times without revealing his/her
preferred time windows. However, the noise is not added to
the measurements collected by the meters, thus maintaining
the real energy consumption unvaried.
We analyze the impact of the size of the player set and
the statistical characterization of the noise to be added to the
individual consumption patterns in order to guarantee a given
privacy threshold. Moreover, we evaluate the degradation of
the protocol performance caused by the alteration of the play-
ers’ data due to noise injection by comparing it to a benchmark
system which does not support privacy preservation.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section
II provides a short overview of the related literature, whereas
Section III describes the privacy-preserving scheduling frame-
work. The attacker model is discussed in Section IV. The
security analysis and the performance assessment of our
proposed infrastructure are provided in Section V. Conclusions
are drawn in the final Section.
II. RELATED WORK
Data perturbation and aggregation are the two main privacy-
preserving approaches originally applied in data mining which
have been leveraged to avoid the inference of sensitive infor-
mation from individual metering data in smart grid scenarios.
Counteracting attacks based on Non-Intrusive Load Monitor-
ing (NILM) of energy usage traces has been addressed by a
consistent body of literature (see [16] for a survey). Typical
solutions rely on battery-based load hiding [17], [18], on
noise injection (e.g. according to the framework of differential
privacy [19]) or on multi-party computation cryptographic
techniques [20], [21]. However, in game-theoretic DSM frame-
works the data communicated by the users are not real energy
consumption measurements but forecasted patterns which are
defined based on the current schedule of the starting time of
their appliances. Such data are circulated during the execution
of the game at the beginning of the optimization horizon.
Despite the substantial body of work on the design of
DSM systems based on game theory, only a few studies
specifically addressed the privacy preservation of the data
exchanged among the participants. Moreover, the security
assumptions modeling the adversarial entities that attempt to
access users’ data are most often too loose with respect to
realistic attack scenarios: some frameworks [22], [11] assume
that exchanging aggregated power consumption data at the
household level (e.g., on hourly basis) is sufficient to hide
the usage patterns of single electric appliances to untrust-
worthy neighbours. However, various studies on NILM [23],
[24] prove that sensitive data can be easily inferred from
house-aggregated measurements. Other proposals assume the
presence of at least one trusted entity that is in charge of
managing energy consumption data: paper [25] avoids data
exchange among households, but includes a trusted energy util-
ity that collects the individual power consumption curves and
broadcasts price information which are updated at every game
iteration, whereas the DSM system discussed in [26] hides
the users’ individual information to any external entity (e.g.,
energy provider or grid manager) but requires the customers to
communicate their power schedules to their neighbors, who are
assumed to be trusted. Conversely, our proposed framework is
completely decentralized and does not involve additional nodes
besides the local energy management systems. Therefore, in
our scenario the adversarial entities are represented by the
game players themselves, who behave according to the honest-
but-curious attacker model.
The impact of a dishonest intrusive attacker manipulating
energy prices to achieve both economical losses and physical
damages is investigated in [27] in the framework of Stack-
elberg game within multiple energy utilities and consumers,
aimed at maximizing the revenue of each utility company and
the payoff of each user. Conversely in our framework the aim
of the adversary is inferring the energy usage preferences of
the users, and not achieving unfair economical advantages.
A communication protocol for a DSM game-theoretical
framework in which each user receives only the overall energy
consumption pattern aggregated over the whole set of the
remaining players has been proposed in [28]. However, spatial
aggregation over multiple users cannot completely avoid in-
formation leakages (think e.g. to the degenerate case in which
all the users but one declare zero consumption for the whole
scheduling horizon). A solution combining data aggregation
and perturbation that provides integrity and accountability to
the messages exchanged among the players is proposed in [29].
The proposed multi-party computation scheme allows a single
player to obtain the aggregate consumption curve of the other
players by exposing a noisy version of his/her individual power
consumption data, obtained by adding a random amount (either
positive or negative) to the actual consumption. However, no
discussion on the statistical characterization of the added noise
is proposed. In this study, we leverage the same combination
of data perturbation and aggregation techniques to evaluate
the dependency of the privacy level on the power of the
perturbation noise. The same paper proves that a dishonest
player has no economic incentives in declaring false electric
energy usages, as long as the declared energy usage remains
equal to the actual amount. Our paper assumes the same
adversarial model, and leverages on the proof therein provided
to propose a protocol enhancement aimed at preventing players
from cheating.
Our proposed protocol leverages some building blocks
firstly appeared in our previous study [30]. With respect to that
work, however, we introduce a novel privacy notion, which
3quantifies the privacy level provided to a single user by means
of the information entropy of the aggregated consumption
data learned by an honest-but-curious adversarial player during
the game iterations. Similar information-theoretic definitions
based on conditional entropy and mutual information have
already been applied to other smart-grid related contexts such
as distributed state estimation [31], [32] and battery-based load
hiding [18], [33], since they quantify the inherent information
available for exploitation by an adversary independently of the
specific algorithm implemented by the attacker. In [33], exten-
sive validations show that entropy-based metrics significantly
outperform privacy measures based on mutual information in
capturing data correlation exhibited by long time-series.
III. THE PRIVACY-FRIENDLY LOADS SCHEDULING
FRAMEWORK
We consider a generic smart grid model in which a set
of residential users, U , has to efficiently allocate its power
demand over a 24-hour time period divided into a set, T ,
of time slots of duration T (the list of symbols used in the
remainder of the paper are reported in Table I). We assume
that each user u ∈ U owns a set of non-preemptive electric
appliances, Au, that must be executed only once during the
day. Each appliance a ∈ Au is characterized by a load profile
having a duration of Nau time slots. The power consumption
of appliance a in the nth time slot of its load profile (with
n ∈ Nau = {1, 2.., Nau}), luan, is assumed to be constant
within the time slot and varies according to the appliance type
and usage (e.g. the specific washing cycle of the dishwasher
selected by the user). The starting time slot of each appliance
a ∈ Au must fall within a time window delimited by a
minimum starting-time slot, STau, and a maximum ending-
time slot, ETau, which have been decided by the user before-
hand. These two parameters represent the user’s preferences
in scheduling each electric appliance.
Each user u ∈ U can have two different kinds of appliances:
• Fixed appliances (e.g., light, TV), represented by the
subset AFu ⊆ Au, are non-manageable devices whose
starting time is fixed. In case of such appliances, their
parameters STau and ETau must satisfy the following
equation ETau − STau = Nau − 1 (“−1” is used
as a consequence of the adoption of a discretized-time
model), which guarantees that fixed devices have only
one possible starting time and that the system is forced
to start them at time STau.
• Shiftable appliances (e.g., washing machine, dishwasher),
represented by the subset ASu ⊆ Au, are manageable
devices whose starting time is a variable of our model.
In case of such appliances, their parameters STau and
ETau must satisfy the following equation ETau−STau >
Nau − 1 which guarantee that each shiftable device has
more than one possible starting time.
In order to run these appliances, each end-user must buy
electric energy from the retailer and his/her goal is to minimize
his/her daily bill by means of optimally scheduling the usage
of his/her appliances. Since the higher the demand of electric-
ity, the larger the capacity of grid generation and distribution
TABLE I
TABLE OF SYMBOLS
Notation Description
U , T set of users and set of time slots within the
optimization horizon
Au = AFu ∪ ASu set of appliances of user u ∈ U , including non-
shiftable (AFu ) and shiftable appliances (ASu )
I = {Iu}u∈U set of strategies Iu of users u ∈ U
P = {Pu}u∈U set of utility functions Pu of users u ∈ U
JU set of iterations of the load scheduling game
played by the users in U
P =
∑
u∈U Pu total utility function of users u ∈ U
Nau, STau, ETau load profile duration, window starting slot, and
window ending slot of appliance a ∈ Au owned
by user u ∈ U
luan power consumption of appliance a ∈ Au owned
by user u ∈ U during slot n ∈ {1, 2, . . . , Nau}
s, cAnc slope of the energy cost function and cost of
ancillary services
T duration of a time slot
pi maximum user energy consumption per slot
yjut energy consumption of user u ∈ U during slot
t ∈ T at game iteration j ∈ JU
pjut aggregated energy consumption of users in U\{u}
during slot t ∈ T at game iteration j ∈ JU
xjat binary variable set to 1 if the start time of appli-
ance a of user u is scheduled at time t ∈ T at
game iteration j ∈ JU , 0 otherwise
rut random noise added by user u ∈ U to his/her
energy consumption at slot t ∈ T
φut energy consumption of user u ∈ U at slot t ∈ T
declared during the initialization round
to install, we model the price of electricity at time t ∈ T ,
ct(·) as an increasing function of the total power demand, yt,
of the group of users U at time t [11].
Since the electricity price is defined as a function of the
total demand of the whole group of users, the load scheduling
problem cannot be solved with a centralized model because of
the conflict between users’ goals. For this reason, a distributed
approach based on a game-theoretic approach is used, since
game theory naturally models interactions in distributed de-
cision making processes. The starting time of each shiftable
appliance will be therefore provided as output of the load
scheduling game described in the next subsection.
A. Load Scheduling Game
The load scheduling problem is modeled as a game G =
{U , I,P}, defined by: the players representing the users in
the set U , the strategy set I , ∏u∈U Iu, where Iu is the
strategy set of player u corresponding to his/her possible load
schedules, and the payoff function set P , {Pu}u∈U , where
Pu is the payoff function of user u, which coincides with
his/her daily electricity bill. Specifically, the strategy of the
player u is Iu , {xat}a∈Au , where xat are binary variables
defined for each appliance a ∈ Au and for each time slot
t ∈ T . These variables are equal to 1 if the appliance a starts
in the time slot t, 0 otherwise. The payoff function of each
player, Pu, is defined as a function of I as follows:
Pu(I) = T
∑
t∈T
yutct(yt) (1)
4where yut is the power demand of user u at time t and is
a function of xat, T is the time slot duration and is used
to convert power in energy demand, and ct(yt) is the price
of electricity at time t and is a function of yt =
∑
u∈U yut,
which represents the total power demand of the players at time
t. In this paper, we focus on a specific class of energy tariffs
named regular pricing functions, which are defined as follows.
Definition 1 (Regular Pricing Function). The pricing function
{ct(yt)}t∈T is a regular pricing function if for any two time
intervals [t1, t2], [t3, t4], power demand in these intervals
{yt}t∈[t1,t2], {yt}t∈[t3,t4] and deviation δy ≥ 0, it holds that:
t2∑
t=t1
ct(yt) >
t4∑
t=t3
ct(yt) =⇒
t2∑
t=t1
ytct(yt)−
t4∑
t=t3
ytct(yt) ≥
≥
t2∑
t=t1
(yt − δy)ct(yt − δy)−
t4∑
t=t3
(yt − δy)ct(yt − δy)
(2)
Notice that when deviation δy is infinitesimally small and
ct(yt) is derivable, the assumption (2) becomes:
t2∑
t=t1
ct(yt) >
t4∑
t=t3
ct(yt) =⇒
t2∑
t=t1
[ytct(yt)]
′ >
t4∑
t=t3
[ytct(yt)]
′
(3)
Let I−u ,
∏
i∈U\u Ii and P (I) be the total cost paid by
all players to the electricity retailer:
P (I) =
∑
u∈U
Pu(I) = T
∑
u∈U
∑
t∈T
yutct(yt) (4)
Then the following Lemma can be proved [34]:
Lemma 1. If {ct(yt)}t∈T is a regular pricing function, then
for any player u ∈ U , for any two strategies i′u, i′′u ∈ Iu and
for any strategy i−u ∈ I−u, it holds that:
Pu(i
′
u, i−u) > Pu(i
′′
u, i−u) =⇒ P (i′u, i−u) > P (i′′u, i−u)
(5)
Based on Lemma 1 and on the definition reported hereafter
of generalized ordinal potential games [35], Theorem 1 can
be immediately obtained.
Definition 2 (Generalized Ordinal Potential Game). Given a
finite strategic game Γ , {U , {Iu}u∈U , {Pu}u∈U}, Γ is a
generalized ordinal potential game if there exists a function
(called potential function) Φ : I → R such that for every
player u ∈ U and every i−u ∈ I−u and i′u, i′′u ∈ Iu, it holds
that:
Pu(i
′
u, i−u) > Pu(i
′′
u, i−u) =⇒ Φ(i′u, i−u) > Φ(i′′u, i−u) (6)
Theorem 1. Under the condition that {ct(yt)}t∈T is a regular
pricing function, the load scheduling game G is a generalized
ordinal potential game, with P (I) defined in Eq. 4 being the
potential function.
Proof. To prove the theorem, it suffices to show that for every
player u ∈ U and every i−u ∈ I−u and i′u, i′′u ∈ Iu, it holds
that:
Pu(i
′
u, i−u) > Pu(i
′′
u, i−u) =⇒ P (i′u, i−u) > P (i′′u, i−u) (7)
For the sake of simplicity, assume that each player u has
only one home appliance (the proof of Theorem 1 in case
of players with multiple appliances can be derived from the
demonstration hereafter presented). Moreover, assume that in
the strategy i′u (i
′′
u, respectively), player u starts his appliance
in time interval [t1, t2] ([t3, t4]). Let y′t denote the total power
demand of players at time t under strategy profile (i′u, i−u).
The difference between the strategy profiles (i′u, i−u) and
(i′′u, i−u) is that player u migrates his power demand, denoted
by pu, from time interval [t1, t2] to [t3, t4]. As a consequence,
one can derive that:
Pu(i
′
u, i−u)− Pu(i′′u, i−u) =
t2∑
t=t1
puct(y
′
t)−
t4∑
t=t3
puct(y
′
t + pu) =
= pu
 t2∑
t=t1
ct(y
′
t)−
t4∑
t=t3
ct(y
′
t + pu)
 (8)
The difference between P (i′u, i−u) and P (i
′′
u, i−u) can also
be derived as follows:
P (i′u, i−u)− P (i′′u, i−u) =
t2∑
t=t1
y′tct(y
′
t) +
t4∑
t=t3
y′tct(y
′
t)+
−
t2∑
t=t1
(y′t − pu)ct(y′t − pu)−
t4∑
t=t3
(y′t + pu)ct(y
′
t + pu) =
=
t2∑
t=t1
y′tct(y
′
t)−
t4∑
t=t3
(y′t + pu)ct(y
′
t + pu)+
−
 t2∑
t=t1
(y′t − pu)ct(y′t − pu)−
t4∑
t=t3
y′tct(y
′
t)
 (9)
Recalling the definition of regular pricing functions, it then
holds that:
Pu(i
′
u, i−u) > Pu(i
′′
u, i−u) =⇒
t2∑
t=t1
ct(y
′
t) >
t4∑
t=t3
ct(y
′
t + pu) =⇒
=⇒
t2∑
t=t1
y′tct(y
′
t)−
t4∑
t=t3
(y′t + pu)ct(y
′
t + pu) >
>
t2∑
t=t1
(y′t − pu)ct(y′t − pu)−
t4∑
t=t3
y′tct(y
′
t) =⇒
=⇒ P (i′u, i−u) > P (i′′u, i−u) (10)
The proof is thus completed.
Potential games have several properties, such as the exis-
tence of at least one pure Nash Equilibrium (NE). Moreover,
such games have the same pure NE when payoffs are re-
placed by the potential function, hence the original problem
is equivalent to a distributed optimization model in which
the objective function is the potential function. Solving the
global problem directly may be prohibitively complex due to
the high dimension of the problem in case of real use-cases.
Moreover, it would require the users to provide a wide set of
sensitive information to the solver. For this reason, distributing
5the computation of smaller problems to each users based
on distributed techniques is, in general, much more efficient
both in terms of computational complexity and privacy. To
this end, one can use the Finite Improvement Property (FIP)
of potential games to solve this problem: any sequence of
asynchronous improvement steps is finite and converges to a
pure equilibrium. Particularly, the sequence of best response
updates converges to a pure equilibrium [36].
In this paper, we assume that ct(yt) is linear with respect
to yt, thus satisfying the regular pricing function conditions.
As a consequence, G is a generalized ordinal potential game
and best response dynamics can be applied to converge to
a NE. In this work, we consider a simple implementation
of the best response dynamics: each player, in an iterative
fashion, defines his/her optimal load scheduling strategy based
on electricity tariffs (calculated according to the strategies of
the other players) and communicates his/her energy plan (i.e.,
his/her daily power demand profile) to the next user of the set
U . We assume that the order in which the players execute the
protocol within a single game iteration is predefined and fixed
for the whole duration of the game, which provides higher
fairness w.r.t random ordering. It also results in the best privacy
level for a given noise power. At every iteration j ∈ JU of the
best response dynamics, energy prices are updated and, as a
consequence, other users can decide to modify their schedules.
In the jth iteration, the optimal schedule of the user u is
obtained by solving the following Mixed Integer Non-linear
Programming (MINLP) model:
min
∑
t∈T
(
yjut · T
)
cjt (11)
s.t.
ETau−Nau+1∑
t=STau
xjat = 1 ∀a ∈ Au (12)
yjut =
∑
a∈Au
∑
n∈Nau :
n≤t
luan · xja(t−n+1) ∀t ∈ T (13)
yjut ≤ pi ∀t ∈ T (14)
cjt = c
Anc + s · (yjut · T + pjut · T ) ∀t ∈ T (15)
The objective function (11) minimizes the daily bill of the
user u. Note that the decision variables xjat appear in the
objective function through the equality constraints (13) and
(15).
Constraints (12) guarantee that each appliance a ∈ Au is
executed only once in the time window [STau, ETau]. Notice
that in order to be executed within time ETau, appliance a
must be started within the interval [STau, ETau − Nau + 1].
Constraints (13) determine the overall consumption of the
appliances in each time slot at iteration j, which depends on
the scheduling strategy: the power required by each device a in
each time slot t, yjut, is equal to power consumption indicated
by the n-th sample (with n ∈ Nau = {1, 2.., Nau}) of the load
profile, luan, executed at time t. Note that the power amount
indicated by the n-th sample of the appliance load profile is
consumed during slot t if and only if the appliance started
at time t − n + 1, thus if xja(t−n+1) = 1. Constraints (14)
Fig. 1. The privacy-friendly communication protocol: initialization round
Fig. 2. The privacy-friendly communication protocol: first round
bound the amount of purchasable power in order not to exceed
the contractual limit, pi. Finally, constraints (15) guarantee
that the electricity price cjt at iteration j in each time slot
t ∈ T is a linear increasing function of the total demand of
the group of users U . Specifically, in constraints (15), pjut is
the total demand of the other players of the set U received
by user u at game iteration j, whereas cAnc is the cost of
ancillary services (e.g., electricity transport, distribution and
dispatching, frequency regulation, power balance) and s is the
slope of the cost function.
The iterative process is repeated until convergence is
reached. Note that the number of iterations required to reach
convergence (i.e., |JU |) may vary for different instances of the
game.
B. The Privacy-Friendly Scheduling Protocol
We now detail the communication protocol run during the
execution of the load scheduling game presented in Section
III-A. The protocol is executed over an Internet Protocol-based
network, comprising both the user nodes as endpoints and
other intermediate nodes such as routers. In addition we also
assume that point-to-point communication among any pair of
users is confidential and authenticated by means of a standard
secure protocol such as IPSec or TLS. As a results, the
logical topology seen by the protocol is a full mesh network
including only the user nodes. Under such assumptions, any
random sequence that includes each user exactly once can
be chosen for running the algorithm. During an initialization
round (numbered as 0), each player u generates two sequences
6φut, rut ∀t ∈ T , where rut ∼ N(0, σ2) is a random variable
representing AWGN noise with zero mean and variance σ2
and the sequence φut for t = 1, . . . , T is an arbitrary partition
of the quantity
∑
a∈Au,n∈Na l
u
an, i.e.:∑
t∈T
φut =
∑
a∈Au,n∈Na
luan (16)
Note that the value of σ2 is defined in order to provide a
target privacy level to a group of |U| users (see Sections
IV and V). The first player (user 1) initializes a sequence
Yju = [Y ju1, . . . , Y ju|T |] as Y 01t = φ1t+r1t ∀t ∈ T and forwards
it to the second player (user 2), who updates it by adding
to each variable Y 01t the corresponding quantity r2t + φ2t
(see Fig. 1). The procedure is repeated for all the players,
until user 1 obtains the final aggregated sequence of elements
Y 0|U|t =
∑
u∈U φut + rut. Note that, since φut are arbitrarily
chosen and rut are random variables, the quantity rut + φut
does not leak any information about the preferential usage
periods [STau, ETau] of each appliance a ∈ Au. Constraint
(16) imposes that the overall declared electricity usage is
consistent with the actual cumulative power consumption of
the appliances to be scheduled. Once the initialization round
is completed, user 1 begins the first game round, calculating
the parameters p11t as:
p11t = Y
0
|U|t − φ1t ∀t ∈ T (17)
and solves the MINLP problem described in Section III-A.
Then, it computes:
Y 11t = p
1
1t + y
1
1t ∀t ∈ T (18)
where y11t is output by the MINLP solver, and forwards it to the
next player (see Fig. 2). This way, user u replaces the partition
φt ∀t ∈ T with his/her own energy consumption curve,
aggregated over all the appliances he/she owns and computed
according to optimal solution of the MINLP problem. This
procedure is repeated by all the users until completion of the
first round of the game. In the following jth iterations (where
j ≥ 2), each user u behaves analogously, by replacing Formula
(17) with:
pjut = Y
j
(u−1)t − yj−1ut ∀t ∈ T
where yj−1ut is the overall energy consumption pattern of user
u computed according to the most recent schedule (i.e., the
schedule obtained at the (j − 1)th iteration), and by applying
Formula (18) as follows:
Y jut = p
j
ut + y
j
ut ∀t ∈ T
It results that, at the jth round, pjut is the sum of the current
total energy consumption pattern (aggregated over the whole
set of users) and of the AWGN noise injected by each of
the users during the initialization round. Note that, during
the initialization round, the u-th player receives the partial
aggregate of the sequences generated by users 1, . . . , u − 1
(i.e., fewer than |U|), thus the variance of the added noise is
not sufficient to provide the target privacy level. Therefore, it
is necessary that the sequences φut transmitted during the first
iteration do not provide any sensitive information. Once the
first round is completed, the aggregate contains |U| random
sequences φut and |U| noise sequences rut, which provide
the desired privacy level. Then, at the beginning of round 1,
the random sequences are gradually substituted with the real
user schedules.
Also notice that the privacy-friendly technique here pro-
posed does not strictly depend on the setup of the game and
may therefore be applied also to other DSM frameworks in
which the convergence to the equilibrium is reached in a
similar manner to the one considered in our work (e.g. [11]).
In addition, it is worth noting that our framework only
requires additive noise and independency of the noise from
the data. We choose to focus on AWGN since it has the
above properties and it is well known and easy to generate. If
additional assumptions are made on the user preferences, it is
possible that other noise spectra and noise distributions result
in better privacy levels for the same noise power. For the sake
of simplicity we do not discuss these issues in this paper.
Finally, we observe that Theorem 1 also applies to the
privacy-preserving algorithm. To prove this, one can think at
the whole aggregate additive noise as the consumption profile
of an additional player u who owns a single fixed appliance,
i.e. ASu = ∅ and AFu = {a}. Its consumption profile spans
the entire optimization horizon (i.e., Nau = T ) and its energy
consumption profile satisfies the following equality:
luat =
∑
u∈U
rut ∀t ∈ T
rut = 0 ∀t ∈ T
There is a single strategy in the set Iu of player u, namely
starting appliance a at the beginning of the optimization
horizon. Consequently, from round 1 on, player u always
outputs the above response.
By virtue of Theorem 1, the privacy-preserving game is an
ordinal potential game and thus the algorithm converges in a
finite amount of steps. The resulting schedule, however, does
not necessarily achieve the minimum electricity bill. In the
following Sections we will discuss the tradeoff between the
increase in the electricity bill and the achieved privacy.
IV. ATTACKER MODEL
A. Security Definitions
We assume a scenario with a fixed set of users U . The set
contains one attacker, denoted as um, who behaves according
to an honest-but-curious model: he/she correctly executes
the protocol but tries to infer the preferred time windows
[STau, ETau] of the appliances a ∈ Au of all the users u ∈ U .
Let Ψ be the multivariate random variable that describes the
probability of each possible combination of users’ preferences.
Let v = [p|JU |um 1, . . . , p
|JU |
um |T |] be the aggregated energy con-
sumption schedule received by attacker um in the last iteration
of the privacy-preserving protocol described in Section III-B.
Since v depends on the users’ preferences and on the random
noise chosen by the users, it can be modeled as an instance of
the |T |-dimensional multivariate random variable V. Clearly,
the knowledge of v improves the attacker’s knowledge about
the time windows chosen by the users before the execution of
7the DSM privacy-preserving protocol. Therefore, analogously
to the definitions provided in [37], [38], we quantify the
privacy provided by our proposed DSM framework as follows:
Definition 3. The architecture provides γ-privacy if it holds
that:
γ = H(Ψ)−H(Ψ|V) (19)
where H(·) indicates the random variable’s information
entropy defined as:
H(X) = E[− log2(P (X))] (20)
being E[·] the expected value operator and P (X) the proba-
bility mass function of the generic random variable X . Note
that, by applying the Bayes’ rule, the following equality holds:
H(Ψ|V) = H(V|Ψ) +H(Ψ)−H(V) (21)
Therefore, by substitution, it results that:
γ = H(Ψ)−H(V|Ψ)−H(Ψ) +H(V) = H(V)−H(V|Ψ)
(22)
The goal of the attacker is to gain information about the
users’ preferences given the knowledge of the aggregated
scheduled consumption. As an extreme case, when γ = 0
the attacker learns nothing. In a general case, the attacker’s
knowledge improves by γ bits, meaning that the attacker is
capable of answering at most γ yes/no questions about the
user preferences.
The relation between the added noise and the privacy level
is discussed in the next Section, in which we numerically
evaluate the privacy level achieved by our proposed privacy-
friendly DSM system versus the added noise power, for
various sizes of the user set. We will show that, as the noise
increases, γ quickly decreases, providing a tradeoff between
privacy and accuracy of the data. Since data accuracy has an
impact on peak demand, we will show that a tradeoff must be
found between privacy expectations and the total bill.
B. Countermeasures against Semi-honest Adversaries
Users may also behave semi-honestly and declare false or
inconsistent consumption patterns during the game iterations
while still adhering to the protocol rules, e.g. in order to
increase the energy cost in some specific slots. In turn, this
may induce other players to alter their schedules accordingly
and the cheaters may take advantage of such alterations.
It has been proved in [29] that a semi-honest player has no
economic incentives in declaring false electric energy usages
during the scheduling definition phase, as long as the declared
aggregated daily consumption remains equal to the actual
amount. This result is still applicable to our privacy-preserving
algorithm as long as as the player cannot simply choose his/her
own noise, but must generate noise independently of the users
preferences. This assumption makes it possible to consider
the privacy-preserving game as a non-privacy-preserving game
in which the added noise is an additional honest player.
Thus, according to [29, Theorem 1], providing false energy
consumption patterns with the same aggregated value of the
true schedule would not lead to any economic benefit. In such
scenario, the cheater may only lie about his/her own scheduled
appliance starting times but cannot modify the aggregated
value of his/her overall energy consumption over the day.
To ensure that the hypotheses of the proof are satisfied it is
necessary either to implement the noise addition and commu-
nication protocol in a tamper-proof device, or to implement
cheat detection mechanisms.
The privacy-preserving protocol can be easily enhanced by
including a Controller, which is not directly involved in the
scheduling protocol, but is in charge of performing security
checks aimed at the detection of cheaters. The Controller
is supposed to have full knowledge of the actual energy
consumption of each user, aggregated on daily basis (e.g., it
is directly informed by the energy utility, which is responsible
for the billing and thus has access to individual energy usage
measurements).
To ensure that users do not declare a false demand, the Con-
troller performs the following checks: at the beginning of the
game, every user communicates the quantities ru =
∑
t∈T rut
and Φu =
∑
a∈Au,n∈Na lan to the Controller. At the end of
each scheduling period, for each user the Controller compares
Φu to his/her actual energy consumption. In case of significant
differences, the user is considered as a cheater. Moreover,
once the initialization round of the protocol is concluded,
the Controller is provided with the sequence Y1u and verifies
whether the equality
∑
t∈T Y
1
ut =
∑
u∈U (Ru + Φu) holds.
This way it is possible to detect whether Ru and Φu provided
by the users to the Controller correspond to the amounts of
energy consumption and noise declared by the user during the
execution of the protocol. In case the equality is not satisfied,
the game is immediately stopped. Finally, in order to prevent
cheaters from changing their declared daily energy consump-
tion throughout the game rounds, at each round j every user
verifies whether the equality
∑
t∈T Y
j
ut =
∑
t∈T Y
j−1
ut holds:
in fact, if all the users behave honestly, the overall daily
aggregate must remain unchanged. In case the equality is not
satisfied, the user reports an alarm message to the Controller
and the game is stopped. The above cheat detection mechanism
can be extended to test for whiteness of the noise and, thus,
independence of the scheduling preferences.
V. NUMERICAL ASSESSMENT
In this section, we first describe the methodology used
in our tests, then we present the numerical results and the
security analysis obtained by applying the Privacy-Friendly
DSM method on instances defined according the Italian power
grid parameters and standard consumer profiles.
A. Test Methodology
In our tests, the 24-hour time horizon is represented by a
set T of 24 time slots of 1 hour each. The parameters of the
electricity tariff, ct, are defined based on the real-time pric-
ing currently used in Italy for large consumers. Specifically,
cAnc = 0.05e/MWh and s = 2.3× 10−4e/MWh2.
In order to evaluate the performance of the privacy-friendly
protocol as the size of the group of users U grows, three
different cases are investigated: 5, 10 and 50 consumers.
8Each of these users u is connected to the grid with a power
limit, pi, of 3 kW and can have up to 4 shiftable appliances
(i.e., ASu = { washing machine, dishwasher, boiler, vacuum
cleaner }) and 7 fixed ones (i.e., AFu = { refrigerator,
purifier, lights, microwave oven, oven, TV and iron}). The
energy consumption patterns of each appliance have been
extracted from a real dataset [39]. For the sake of easiness,
the duration of the time intervals [STau, ETau] are all set to
D time slots, i.e. ETau = STau + D − 1 ∀u ∈ U , a ∈ Au.
Further, STau is a random variable with uniform distribution
in [1, |T | − (D − 1)]. As for the starting-time slot STau
and ending-time slot ETau of the appliances, 10 different
instances are generated by randomly defining these parameters.
Specifically, the starting-time slot of each appliance, STau,
is randomly selected for each user to represent a population
of heterogeneous consumers. On the other hand, the ending-
time slot, ETau, is defined as STau + Nau + 6 in the case
of shiftable appliances ASu , guaranteeing therefore 8 different
possible schedules for each device, and as STau +Nau− 1 in
the case of fixed appliances AFu , so as to force the system to
start each of these devices at time STau.
The AWGN used in the Privacy-Friendly load scheduling
game, rut, is generated randomly for each user. In order to
assess the performance of the Privacy-Friendly solution as
the noise increases, six different cases are considered for
its standard deviation, σ: 1, 100, 200, 300, 400 and 500 W.
Moreover, for each of these cases, 100 different instances of
the AWGN are created. In Subsection V-B, only the average
results obtained for each test case (i.e., number of users and
AWGN standard deviation) are reported.
In order to evaluate the performance of the proposed
Privacy-Friendly DSM game, the following metrics are mea-
sured:
• Total bill: is the electricity bill of the group of houses,
P (I).
• Peak demand: is the peak of the aggregated power de-
mand of the group of users U and is defined as maxt yt.
• Convergence time: represents the number of iterations of
the best response dynamics required to converge to the
Nash Equilibrium.
In Section V-B and V-C, we evaluate the performance of
the privacy-friendly protocol. Specifically, in Section V-B,
we report the results obtained when each user has only one
appliance (i.e., washing machine). This case is indeed the
least computationally burdensome one and, therefore, we used
it to extensively test the privacy-friendly protocol, even in
large-scale scenarios. At a latter stage, in Section V-C, we
discuss the numerical results obtained with a higher number
of appliances, but only in case of smaller scenarios (i.e., 5
end-users).
B. Performance Evaluation: Test Case A
In this test case, each user u ∈ U owns a single shiftable
appliance (i.e., a washing machine). Figures 3 and 4 illustrate,
respectively, the total bill and the peak demand obtained by
using our proposed DSM privacy-friendly mechanism, as a
0 100 200 300 400 5001
1.02
1.04
1.06
1.08
AWGN Standard Deviation [W]
N
or
m
al
iz
ed
 T
ot
al
 B
ill
 
 
5 Users
10 Users
50 Users
Fig. 3. Normalized total bill of the DSM game equilibrium as a function of
the standard deviation of the AWGN noise, for different cardinalities of U
and one appliance per user.
function of the standard deviation, σ, of the AWGN noise rut.
Specifically, for each size of the group of consumers, we report
the results normalized with respect to a benchmark scenario in
which σ = 1 W (i.e. the standard deviation is so low that the
addition of noise to the scheduled consumption profiles leads
to negligible alterations and intuitively provides no privacy
preservation), in order to show the net effect of the privacy-
friendly protocol on the performance of the DSM. Notice that
the comparison between the performance of the proposed load
scheduling game and the benchmark case without demand-
side management has already been presented and discussed in
[34], where it is shown that the electricity bill and the peak
demand decrease by as much as 55% with respect to the case
without DSM and that this gain is influenced by the appliances
flexibility and householders preferences.
As it can be observed in Figure 3, the injection of AWGN
noise may affect the performance of the demand-side man-
agement system in terms of the total bill. The maximum gap
between the overall consumers’ electricity bills with respect to
the benchmark scenario is around 7%. Moreover, as expected,
this gap increases as the number of users grows, since the
greater is the size of the group of players, the greater is the
overall noise added by the users.
The privacy-friendly protocol has worse performance when
considering the peak demand of the consumers. Specifically,
as shown in Figure 4, the peak of the aggregated power
demand of users increases by up to 110% when adding noise
to the real power demand of the players. Nevertheless, it
is worth noting that in our tests the peak demand obtained
when applying the proposed DSM system has always been
lower than that experienced without any demand-management
framework, independently of the standard deviation of the
AWGN noise.
The convergence time of the load scheduling mechanism
is another important metric to be considered in assessing
the applicability of the proposed solution to real use-case
scenarios. In Figure 5 we show the number of iterations
required to reach the equilibrium as a function of the standard
deviation of the AWGN noise. As expected, the convergence
time grows as the standard deviation, σ, increases. This
inherent limitation of the privacy-friendly protocol appears
to require a compromise between the opposing needs of fast
convergence rate and good privacy level. However, a decrease
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Fig. 4. Normalized peak demand of the DSM game equilibrium as a function
of the standard deviation of the AWGN noise, for different cardinalities of U
and one appliance per user.
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Fig. 5. Number of iterations required to converge to the equilibrium of the
DSM game as a function of the AWGN noise standard deviation, for different
cardinalities of U and one appliance per user.
of the convergence speed is acceptable since no tight real-time
constraint is imposed in day-ahead load scheduling problems
such as the one considered in this work.
The privacy level achieved by our framework is evaluated by
computing γ according to Eq. 22. Results reported in Figure
6 show that increasing the standard deviation of the AWGN
noise causes a consistent decrease in the entropy difference,
thus providing a lower γ and a higher user privacy. We also
observe that the higher is the cardinality of the set of users,
the higher is the noise standard deviation required to achieve a
given privacy threshold (e.g., setting γ = 2 requires a standard
deviation of 50 W in case of 5 users, whereas for 10 users the
required noise standard deviation is approximately 210 W).
C. Performance Evaluation: Test Case B
In this test case, each user u ∈ U has multiple appliances.
Specifically, we have investigated three different scenarios:
1) Each user has 5 appliances, 2 of which are shiftable
(ASu = {washing machine and dishwasher}) and 3 are
fixed (AFu = {refrigerator, lights and oven}).
2) Each user has 8 appliances, 3 of which are shiftable
(ASu = {washing machine, dishwasher and boiler}) and
5 are fixed (AFu = {refrigerator, lights, oven, TV and
iron}).
3) Each user has 11 appliances, 4 of which are shiftable
(ASu = {washing machine, dishwasher, boiler and vac-
uum cleaner}) and 7 are fixed (AFu = {refrigerator,
lights, oven, TV, iron, purifier and microwave oven}).
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Fig. 6. Privacy level as a function of the AWGN noise standard deviation,
for various sizes of U .
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Fig. 7. Normalized total bill of the DSM game equilibrium as a function
of the AWGN noise standard deviation, for U = 5 and various numbers of
appliances per user.
Figure 7 illustrates the total bill obtained by applying our
proposed DSM privacy-friendly mechanism to a group of 5
consumers, as a function of the standard deviation, σ, of the
AWGN noise rut. Specifically, for each size of the set of the
consumers’ appliances, we report the results normalized with
respect to the benchmark scenario in which almost no noise is
injected (i.e., σ = 1 W). As it can be observed, also in this test
case the gap between the overall consumers’ electricity bills
and the benchmark scenario increases as the AWGN standard
deviation increases. However, the effect of the AWGN noise
on the performance of the DSM system becomes less and
less significant as the number of appliances per user grows.
Indeed, the greater is the number of appliances, the smaller is
the ratio between the energy of the noise injected by users and
their overall energy demand. For this reason, the greater is the
number of appliances, the less energy prices (and consequently
users’ decisions) are influenced by the noise. Notice that in our
tests the same effect has also been observed in reference to
the peak demand of users. However, for the sake of brevity,
we do not report here these results.
Finally, Figure 8 depicts the trend of the privacy level γ ver-
sus the standard deviation of the injected noise. With respect
to the single-appliance case, γ decreases more smoothly as σ
increases. For example, this a standard deviation of 300 W is
necessary to achieve γ < 2. Therefore, the higher the number
of deferrable appliances in the system, the higher the noise to
be injected to guarantee a given privacy level.
Based on the above discussed results, we conclude that high
values of σ (e.g. 500 W) lead to very moderate increments
of the daily bill (at most 7% w.r.t. the benchmark case for
10
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Fig. 8. Privacy level as a function of the AWGN noise standard deviation,
for U = 5 and various numbers of appliances per user.
a scenario with 50 users) but provide a high privacy level,
since for such values γ approaches 0. Therefore, privacy
can be achieved at the price of a slight increase in the
electricity cost and of an acceptable growth of the number
of iterations required for the game convergence, provided that
the electricity grid is correctly dimensioned to cope with the
increase of the peak demand due to noise injection.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper proposes a privacy-preserving distributed de-
mand side management system for the scheduling of power
consumption requests generated by electrical appliances in a
Smart Grid scenario. The interactions among the appliance
owners are modeled by means of a load scheduling game
which operates by exclusively relying on aggregated and
noisy energy consumption data, perturbed by additive white
Gaussian noise. We show that the performance of the proposed
system are only marginally affected by the data perturbation
mechanism, and we evaluate the number of players and the
noise power required to achieve a given privacy level, which
is evaluated by means of the information entropy of the
aggregated energy consumption patterns.
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